Moscow’s ‘reactive’ foreign policy risks turning Russia into a declining power by Nitoiu, Cristian
Vladimir Putin on 27 April 2015, Credit: Kremlin.ru
30/04/2015
Moscow’s ‘reactive’ foreign policy risks turning Russia into a
declining power
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/04/30/moscows-reactive-foreign-policy-risks-turning-russia-into-a-declining-power/
How have Russia’s long-term foreign policy goals been aﬀected by the Ukraine crisis? Cristian
Nitoiu writes that Russia’s actions during the crisis have been largely reactive and that the country
has suﬀered from both isolation from the West and the perception from non-Western actors that it
now operates from a position of weakness. He argues that a clear long-term strategy is required to
prevent Russia from becoming a declining power on the global stage.
Throughout the Ukraine crisis Russia has seemed to be one step ahead of the West. Its actions
have caught the EU and US by surprise and the West was not prepared to counter Russia’s
assertive stance during the crisis. Despite this, however, the image of Russia taking the lead in the crisis is
nevertheless highly misleading.
At ﬁrst glance the Russian annexation of Crimea and support for the rebels in the Donbass region could be seen as
part of a well-deﬁned long-term strategy which had been planned in advance. However, Russia’s foreign policy is
far more reactive than this. Putin has proven to be skilled at anticipating the moves of the West, as well as their
response to Russia’s actions. Moscow’s engagement in Ukraine was in fact a reaction to the perception that a
change in the world order is imminent and being driven by the West.
For the Kremlin, the US intervention in Iraq, the independence of Kosovo and the Arab Spring have been a sign that
the West is trying to carve out a new world order from which Russia is increasingly squeezed out. Russia’s assertive
actions in Ukraine can be framed as a response to this: Moscow hoped that by acting ﬁrst and by surprising the
West it could take advantage of the changing world order and transform the rules of the game for its own beneﬁt.
Putin himself has characterised the decision to annex Crimea and reshape the geopolitics of the region as a sudden
reaction to the fall of the Yanukovych regime.
Besides catching the West oﬀ guard, Russia has also
aimed to strike friendships with other powers
unhappy at what they see as the Western-led world
order. China, India and Turkey have been at the
forefront of Putin’s eﬀorts to push for a world order
where Russia has an important voice. He has swayed
the leaders of these countries with preferential
energy or military deals in exchange for the
recognition of Russia’s status as a great power.
However, both strategies are not sustainable in the
medium-term and already seem to have become
problematic.
First, Russia has lost the element of surprise. The
West has lost what faith it had in Putin and is now
less willing to accept that Russia is working for a
peaceful resolution to the conﬂict and the
preservation of Ukraine within its current borders.
Reports of Russian soldiers ﬁghting in the Donbass
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region have also ﬂooded the internet, making it increasingly diﬃcult for the Kremlin to convince the international
community of its neutrality in the conﬂict.
Moreover, both the EU and the US are far better prepared than a year ago to take a decisive stance toward Russia.
In the event of a further breakdown of the Minsk agreement, which has been predicted in the West, the US is likely
to more seriously consider sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. This will not only escalate the conﬂict, but will also
see Russia trapped in a situation that is bound to strain its economy, which is already weakened by current military
eﬀorts and economic sanctions. While the EU may have ‘sleepwalked’ into the crisis when it pushed for Ukraine to
sign its Association Agreement, Russia is now sleepwalking into a conﬂict which the West is increasingly more
willing and better equipped to handle.
Second, Putin’s eﬀorts to secure support from non-Western powers have fallen short of achieving their desired
eﬀects. These actions have not been part of a clearly deﬁned long-term strategy, but have rather been a reaction to
the stand-oﬀ with the West and other developments such as the US ‘pivot’ toward Asia.
China, India, and Turkey view Russia as an increasingly isolated state which is in a position of vulnerability. They
have therefore come to appreciate that they hold the upper hand in most negotiations with Moscow. Moreover, there
are indications that Russia’s refusal to acknowledge the presence of Russian troops in Crimea and the Donbass
region has made these states less willing to place trust in Moscow’s good faith.
Putin’s visits to each of these countries over the last year have been presented by the Kremlin as key successes in
his strategy for challenging the West. However in each case Putin was faced with extremely tough negotiations and
was forced to make concessions far greater than he would have wished. The overall impression portrayed to the rest
of the world by these actions has not been one of strength, but of a Russia that is in decline and which may already
classify as a second rate power.
Vulnerability and dishonesty are dangerous traits in a multipolar world and in order to shake oﬀ this image Russia
will need to present a model of engaging with global actors on a more strategic basis, rather than merely anticipating
or reacting to what other states do. There are three elements which could be included in such an approach.
First, Russia should seek to build trust with other states by shifting its discourse from simply defending Russia’s
national interest to a more general approach that takes a lead on key areas of global concern, such as humanitarian
issues. By adopting a strategy that looks beyond the abstract ideas of patriotism, nationalism and sovereignty,
Moscow could emphasise that it seeks to act globally rather than merely to enhance its national interests at the
expense of others.
Second, Russia must address the perception that isolation from the West has made it vulnerable. Ultimately, this
would entail a long-term process of shifting the sources of power and wealth of the Russian state. However a short-
term goal should be to diversify the Russian economy and end its over-reliance on energy and military exports. A
more solid and diverse economy based on the development of other sectors such as agriculture and general
manufacturing would make Russia less vulnerable to sanctions or the hard-bargains driven by non-Western actors.
Finally, Russia must show that it can oﬀer a more viable and equal alternative to the Western-led world order. It
needs to convince other states that the Russian alternative does not involve mere extortion and gives an equal voice
to states disaﬀected by the West. Currently, Russia’s main alternative, the Eurasian Union, is failing in this regard,
as Belarus and Kazakhstan are increasingly exhibiting a lack of inﬂuence over its direction.
Survival as a great power in a multipolar world is ultimately about taking the initiative and being recognised by other
states. On both counts, Russia’s current foreign policy falls short of meeting these principles. Without shifting its
approach from a reactive strategy to an active one built on clear long-term goals, Russia is at risk of returning to the
level of status and power it held during the 1990s.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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